This explainer was last updated October 14, 2026.
Voting technologies have developed alongside advances in information processing technology. Paper ballots gradually displaced viva voce (voice) voting during the nineteenth century and were phased out in the late 1800s, when jurisdictions began to use automation to assist in counting votes. Today, technologies assist not only the ballot counting process, but also in marking and casting ballots. Geographic patterns in technology adoption emerge in response to election policy, but factors such as ballot complexity, funding, and security concerns have also greatly influenced state adoption of voting technologies.
Types of voting technologies
Historically, five types of voting systems have been used throughout the United States: hand-counted paper, mechanical lever machines, punch-card machines, scanned paper ballots, and direct-recording electronic devices.
Hand-Counted Paper Ballots
Prior to the widespread adoption of voting technologies, voters used hand-counted paper ballots to select their preferred candidate. These ballots were then counted by hand after the close of polls, usually in the precinct where they were cast. While paper ballots are still used throughout the U.S., they are often tabulated—counted and totaled—by a machine. Today, very few jurisdictions solely count paper ballots by hand, and those that do often have fewer than 1,000 registered voters.
Image of a hand-counted paper ballot for the Township of Sturgis in St. Joseph County, Michigan. Image provided by the Sturgis Historical Museum.
Mechanical Lever Voting Machines
Mechanical lever voting machines emerged in the 1890s and allowed voters to indicate their choice by depressing a lever next to the preferred candidate. As shown below, mechanical lever machines were kept inside voting booths, concealed by a retractable curtain to ensure privacy. Machines often contained an interlocking mechanism that prevented the voter from selecting more candidates than allowed for that contest, also known as overvoting. Once the voter finished marking their ballot, they pulled the large lever again, which incremented the counters for their choices and prepared the machine for the next voter. At the end of Election Day, votes were counted by opening the machine and reading the numbers on the counters associated with all the candidates.
Image of a mechanical lever voting machine. Voters enter the booth and close the curtains for privacy before selecting their preferred candidates. They then pull the red lever to record their selections. Image provided by Paul Buckowski, Times Union.
Punch-Card Voting Machines
Punch-card voting devices were developed in the 1960s and relied on modified Hollerith cards — an early medium for storing digital data — to record votes. Voters most commonly operated them by inserting a blank pre-scored card into a holder. The holder contained a ballot and a set of targets associating each choice with a punch position on the card. Voters would vote for a candidate by using a stylus to dislodge a chad (the pre-scored bit of paper) and create a hole in the card associated with the candidate’s number. When the voter was done, they would take the ballot card and deposit it in a ballot box. At the end of Election Day, the ballots were counted using a card reader, usually in the central election office.
Image of a punch-card voting machine featuring a sample ballot in a punch-card holder. The stylus is attached to the machine via a chain. Image provided by UC Berkeley.
Optical Scanners
Optical scanners were first used in the 1960s to help count paper ballots. Operationally, optical scanners differ significantly from mechanical lever voting machines and punch-card devices. The latter two devices are used to mark ballots directly, while optical scanners are used solely to tabulate ballots. Early optical scanners were essentially the same technology used to scan standardized tests. Today, however, optical scanners use advanced imaging technology to analyze ballots and tabulate votes, rather than relying solely upon light-sensor detection of ballot markings. This allows modern scanners to flag errors such as overvotes and, depending on the scanner, let voters correct them before casting their ballots.
In jurisdictions that use optical scanners, voters often mark a paper ballot in a private booth by darkening an oval, completing an arrow, or filling in a box for each selection on their ballot. In others, voters use a ballot marking device (BMD), which presents an electronic ballot on a screen and allows the voter to select contest options and verify the accuracy of their selections. The BMD then prints a paper copy of the voter’s ballot.
Left: Hand-fed optical scanner produced by Hart Intercivic. Voters insert their paper ballot into the scanner and then use the screen to verify there are no issues with their ballot. Once verified, the machine tabulates the ballot and deposits it into its integrated ballot box. Election officials receive tabulation reports from each machine at the close of polls. Image provided by Hart Intercivic.
Right: Ballot marking device designed by the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk’s Office (LA RR/CC). Voters use the touch screen to mark their ballots electronically before verifying their selections and printing a paper copy of their ballot via the machine. The voter then deposits their ballot into the machine’s integrated ballot box, where they await transfer to a central count facility. Image provided by the LA RR/CC.
Left: Hand-fed optical scanner produced by Hart Intercivic. Voters insert their paper ballot into the scanner and then use the screen to verify there are no issues with their ballot. Once verified, the machine tabulates the ballot and deposits it into its integrated ballot box. Election officials receive tabulation reports from each machine at the close of polls. Image provided by Hart Intercivic.
Right: Ballot marking device designed by the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk’s Office (LA RR/CC). Voters use the touch screen to mark their ballots electronically before verifying their selections and printing a paper copy of their ballot via the machine. The voter then deposits their ballot into the machine’s integrated ballot box, where they await transfer to a central count facility. Image provided by the LA RR/CC.
Left: Hand-fed optical scanner produced by Hart Intercivic. Voters insert their paper ballot into the scanner and then use the screen to verify there are no issues with their ballot. Once verified, the machine tabulates the ballot and deposits it into its integrated ballot box. Election officials receive tabulation reports from each machine at the close of polls. Image provided by Hart Intercivic.
Right: Ballot marking device designed by the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk’s Office (LA RR/CC). Voters use the touch screen to mark their ballots electronically before verifying their selections and printing a paper copy of their ballot via the machine. The voter then deposits their ballot into the machine’s integrated ballot box, where they await transfer to a central count facility. Image provided by the LA RR/CC.
What happens after a voter has marked their paper ballot depends on whether ballots are counted by each precinct or at a central location. In jurisdictions where ballots are counted in precincts, an optical scanner is often connected to a ballot box (shown in the image provided above on the left). Voters feed their ballot into the optical scanner that reads their selections as the ballot is deposited into the ballot box. Precincts then count ballots at the end of Election Day by printing a tabulation report from the optical scanners. Precinct vote totals are then transferred, by paper or electronically, back to the central election office.
In jurisdictions where ballots are scanned and tabulated at a central facility, ballots are placed in a ballot box (as shown in the image provided above on the right) and then securely transferred to a central counting facility at the end of Election Day. At these facilities, ballots are scanned by hand-fed or high-speed batch-fed optical scanners. Hand-fed scanners accept one ballot at a time, inserted manually by a voter or election official, while batch-fed scanners automatically draw ballots from a stack loaded into a feeder tray, allowing them to process ballots more efficiently. Officials at central count facilities can then print vote totals and report them to the proper election authority.
Direct-Recording Electronic Systems
Jurisdictions began to adopt Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE) systems in the 1970s. The earliest DREs were essentially electronic versions of mechanical lever machines, with push buttons replacing the levers and electrical storage devices replacing mechanical counters. However, modern DREs are essentially portable computers configured to display ballot choices and then record votes electronically. Touch screens are the most common way for voters to mark their ballots, although older systems still rely on push buttons. Once voters cast their ballots on a DRE, their selections are recorded directly into computer memory. DREs also increasingly include a paper record called a Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) that can be used to audit or conduct a recount.
Image of the ImageCast X direct-recording electronic voting machine produced by Liberty Vote. Voters mark and verify their candidate selections on the touch screen before casting their ballot. Image provided by Verified Voting.
History of voting technologies in the U.S.
While the development of voting systems coincides with advances in technology, factors such as funding, public scrutiny, and evolving regulations have led to a patchwork of systems being used both within and across states. Figure 1 below identifies the voting technologies used in the U.S. in recent decades and how their usage has changed over time.
Figure 1 above features a bar graph depicting trends in voting technology adoption and use between 1988 and 2026. DREs grew in popularity in the early 2000s through 2016, at which point use of optical scanners and BMDs began to dominate the voting technology landscape.
Despite the rise of mechanical lever machines at the turn of the twentieth century, hand-counted paper ballots remained common throughout the country. Improvements to ballot boxes and ballot design helped combat political manipulation and reduced voter confusion; however, hand-counting remained slow, costly, and subject to human error. Longer ballots also exacerbated these issues. Under American federalism, a single ballot can contain dozens of races, spanning federal, state, and local government offices. Moreover, Americans’ distrust of appointed officials led to an increasing number of elected offices on ballots. The desire to count ballots more accurately and efficiently led states to incorporate technology-supported systems into the voting process.
By the 1980s, mechanical-lever machines and punch-card voting systems had come to dominate the election technology landscape. Mechanical lever voting machines were first introduced in the 1890s and helped make the voting process more accurate and efficient. For voters, these machines helped prevent overvotes and allowed them to cast their ballot in the same booth where they made their selections. For administrators, mechanical lever machines tallied votes throughout Election Day, allowing them to report the results of every contest shortly after the polls closed.
While mechanical lever voting machines transformed the voting process, maintenance was complex, and operating the lever was not accessible for people with physical disabilities. Many voters also found it difficult to verify their ballot selections because the only way to do so was to visually inspect the positions of the levers. Once the lever was depressed, there was also no recorded image or paper trail of the voter’s selections. Because of these and other challenges, jurisdictions gradually phased out mechanical lever machines in the late 1970s and 1980s in favor of punch-card voting machines, optical scanners, and DREs. The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 effectively outlawed their use in federal elections.
Like mechanical lever machines, punch-card voting machines peaked in use in the 1980s and declined modestly until the 2000 presidential election. Compared to hand-counted paper ballots, punch-card machines allowed for faster ballot tabulation. Machines could tabulate punch-card ballots at a central office, improving ballot-counting speed and the reporting of results. Unlike mechanical lever machines, they also produced a physical record of voters’ selections that could be read by hand when necessary, including during recounts.
Punch-card voting machines became embroiled in controversy during the 2000 presidential election when Florida election officials struggled to interpret voter selections during the statewide recount due to “hanging chads” that failed to separate from the punch cards correctly and other ballot artifacts. As a result, the public heavily scrutinized the outcome of the election in Florida, and jurisdictions nationwide began to aggressively phase out punch-card voting machines. Between the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, their usage was cut in half, with HAVA effectively mandating the retirement of punch-card and mechanical-lever-machine systems.
By 2004, a patchwork of technology-assisted systems was used throughout the United States. Using federal funds from HAVA, many jurisdictions purchased optical scanners to help count paper ballots. Jurisdictions first used optical scanners in the 1960s, but by the 2000s, the technology had advanced significantly in terms of reliability and counting speed. Optical scan ballots also helped reduce ambiguity in determining voter intent—a significant concern for both administrators and the public following the Florida controversy in 2000. As seen in Figure 2, optical scanners are still widely used throughout the U.S. for tabulating mail ballots. Approximately 80% of jurisdictions utilize batch-fed optical scanners that process hundreds of mail ballots per minute in bulk.
Figure 2 above features a map of the U.S. showing mail ballot tabulation technologies used in all counties in 2026. Batch-fed optical scanners are the most common, particularly in the western U.S., followed by hand-fed optical scanners. Hand-counted paper ballots are only used in a select few jurisdictions. Jurisdictions are categorized as “Mixed” if they utilize more than one tabulation method. Jurisdictions are categorized as “Other” if tabulation methods were not present in the data file.
Figure 2 above features a map of the U.S. showing mail ballot tabulation technologies used in all counties in 2026. Batch-fed optical scanners are the most common, particularly in the western U.S., followed by hand-fed optical scanners. Hand-counted paper ballots are only used in a select few jurisdictions. Jurisdictions are categorized as “Mixed” if they utilize more than one tabulation method. Jurisdictions are categorized as “Other” if tabulation methods were not present in the data file.
Jurisdictions began to adopt Direct-Recording Electronic (DRE) systems largely during the same period as optical scanners, but their use stagnated in the late 2000s and remained well below that of optical scanners (see Figure 1). HAVA’s accessibility requirements heavily influenced state adoption of DREs in the early 2000s given that, at the time, they were one of few systems that allowed people with physical disabilities and those who are blind or visually impaired to vote privately and independently. Since 2008, state use of DREs has declined due to concerns regarding the role of computers in recording and tabulating votes, particularly DREs that do not produce a VVPAT.
Geographic distribution of voting technology
Throughout the U.S., optical scanners are the primary technology used to tabulate both paper ballots cast in-person and those received by mail (see Figure 2). However, state divergence emerges when looking at the technologies voters use to mark their ballots. Irrespective of region, most U.S. voters use paper ballots, either marked by hand or with a BMD. Jurisdictions may provide a BMD to some voters, but often limit its use to voters with disabilities. BMDs are more widely available to voters in Texas, Nevada, South Carolina, Georgia, and West Virginia. Overall, the use of DREs has dwindled, as is shown by Figure 3 below; DREs are now common in only three states: Louisiana, Tennessee, and Indiana.
Figure 3 above features a map of the U.S. showing election day voting technologies used in all counties in 2026. Hand-marked paper ballots are the most common when supported by BMDs, either for some voters, such as voters with disabilities, or all voters.
When analyzed alongside state election policy, geographic patterns in voting technology emerge. Figure 4 below shows the geographic distribution of by-mail/absentee voting policies throughout the United States. When viewed together, Figure 3 and Figure 4 show that paper ballots tabulated by optical scanners dominate the technology landscape in the western United States where by-mail voting is more common. While BMDs are often available for some voters, such as voters with disabilities, these jurisdictions primarily invest in batch-fed optical scanners given the need to process high volumes of mail ballots, rather than accommodate in-ballot marking. By contrast, DREs and hand-fed optical scanners are more common in states such as Indiana, Texas, South Carolina, Tennessee, and West Virginia where by-mail/absentee voting policies are more restrictive, and in-person voting is the primary means of casting a ballot. In other words, adoption of voting technologies has not only been influenced by federal funding and, historically, ballot length, but is also actively driven by state election policy.
Figure 4 above features a map of the U.S. showing mail and absentee ballot voting policies in all 50 states as of July 2026. All-mail elections are most common in western states while southern states often require voters to provide an excuse to vote by mail or absentee.
Security concerns with voting technologies
Election security and integrity have long shaped the voting process and significantly influenced the adoption of voting technologies throughout the United States. Following the controversy surrounding punch-card voting systems in Florida during the 2000 presidential election, HAVA provided legal and financial incentives to states to transition to using DREs and optical scanners for ballot tabulation. As a result, DRE usage in the U.S. grew significantly between the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, but has declined steadily since then. This decline can be attributed to concerns among the computer science community regarding the role of computers in recording and tabulating votes, particularly DREs that do not produce a paper trail. Today, DREs without a VVPAT are only used in Louisiana.
Over time, members of the computer science community have remained steadfast in their opposition to DREs. While some of their claims remain controversial among election administrators, much of their research into the accuracy and security of computerized vote-tallying is grounded in scientific principles and published in peer-reviewed journals. By contrast, the 2020 election marked an inflection point when politicians, most notably President Donald Trump, claimed that widespread fraud had compromised the results of the election, and that fraud stemmed in part from rigged voting machines, claims that have been regularly refuted.
President Trump’s distrust of voting technology has continued into his second term, notably culminating in the March 2025 Executive Order titled Preserving and Protecting the Integrity of American Elections (EO 14248). As it pertains to voting technology, the executive order directed the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to revise federal voting machine guidelines, known as the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), to disfavor the use of barcodes or QR codes in vote counting, except where necessary to accommodate voters with disabilities, and would have required voting systems to produce voter-verifiable paper records. It also directed the EAC to rescind earlier certifications of voting equipment. Although certification requirements are generally only relevant to the purchase of new equipment, the common belief that changes to the VVSG would immediately render existing systems unusable heightened controversy over the order. Moreover, the requirements under the EO to depart from the EAC’s ordinary migration policy, under which adoption of a new VVSG does not invalidate existing standards, also generated substantial controversy.
The EAC’s Technical Guidelines Development Committee discussed changes to the voluntary certification standards consistent with the Executive Order in 2025 and 2026, but never reached consensus. President Trump’s July dismissal of two commissioners, following the resignation of two others, left it unable to approve new VVSG guidelines that complied with the Executive Order, although career staff may continue routine certification activities. Furthermore, Judge John Chun of the Western District of Washington held that Section 4(b) of the Executive Order, which pertained to changing the VVSG, exceeded the president’s authority and permanently enjoined the EAC from taking any action to implement it. However, the EAC did adopt an independent policy for removing unsupported, unused “end-of-life” systems from its active list, but that policy expressly stated it does not invalidate the systems’ prior certification.
Despite roadblocks to decertifying the use of QR codes to represent voters’ choices, debates on the use of these codes continue, most notably in Georgia.
Use of the internet and email to electronically return ballots has also gained much attention in recent years as states have increasingly explored these methods to expand ballot access. While electronic ballot return is more advanced than ever, security concerns have hindered its adoption. Concerns center on the ability of malicious actors to intercept a vote cast remotely and on “denial-of-service” attacks on computer systems that receive ballots. States such as South Carolina have developed “sandboxing” protocols to mitigate the risk of hackers gaining access to local networks via emailed ballots; however, the risk is never zero.
Attention to the integrity of mobile voting grew in the late 2010s as states such as West Virginia launched pilot programs allowing military and overseas voters to cast ballots using an app on their smartphone. The usability of the app was well-received by voters and state election officials, but concerns were raised among security experts regarding the security vulnerabilities. These findings, along with a report from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, have shed light on the potential vulnerabilities of using the internet for voting, and have played a role in hindering states from adopting electronic ballot return methods beyond those for military and overseas voters. Today, thirty-two states, Washington, D.C., and the Virgin Islands allow some form of electronic return for at least some voters. These laws primarily apply to military or overseas voters, or voters with disabilities.
Data sources
Verified Voting, The Verifier
National Conference of State Legislatures, No-Excuse Absentee Voting
Suggested readings
Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project. 2001. "Voting: What Is, What Could Be."
Norden, Lawrence, and Christopher Famighetti. 2015. "America’s Voting Machines at Risk."
Jones, Douglas W. 2003. "A Brief Illustrated History of Voting."
Saltman, Roy G. 1988. "Accuracy, Integrity, and Security in Computerized Vote-Tallying." Communications of the ACM 31 (10): 1184–1191.
Saltman, Roy G. 2005. The History and Politics of Voting Technology: In Quest of Integrity and Public Confidence. New York: Palgrave.
Stewart, Charles III. 2011. "Voting Technologies." Annual Review of Political Science 14: 353–378.